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) If it is only the speaker's information that counts in c, then [[B]] c ,i will be the set of worlds compatible with the evidence she has access to at i. Analyses in the spirit of the canon predict context sensitivity of might and must : since what is known can vary with context-either by varying who the relevant knowers are or by varying what it is they know-so can the domains over which the modals quantify.
Given both the power and the flexibility of the canon, it is a bit of a surprise that simple cases of modal disagreement seem to pose a problem for it. Here is an old example from Kratzer (1986) Kratzer 1981) . We will take indices to be world-time pairs.
In view of your evidence, it cannot possibly be Fred, it must be Martin. If this is so, my utterance of (5) and your utterance of (6) are both true.
(5) The person approaching might be Fred. (6) The person approaching cannot be Fred. Had I uttered (6) and you (5), both our utterances would have been false. that "you" and "I" are disagreeing: (5) and (6) seem incompatible. Kratzer's verdict is that (5) and (6) 
What Kratzer does not comment on is the feeling
if and only if there is a recent-ish t < t c such that [[might(B)(P)]] c , w c ,t ,a = 1. While the modal will pass on the shifted time to the evaluation of the prejacent, the modal base selects a set of worlds independent of the index. That is, the modal base of worlds we are quantifying over will be determined by what is known at a, in particular at t a . So, since Sophie knows at t a that there is no ice cream in the freezer, no worlds in [[B]]
c ,i,a will be P-worlds.
That means the embedded might-claim is bound to be false no matter the choice of t: [[might(B)(P)]] c , w c ,t ,a = 0. And that means that the PAST-claim (21b) is predicted to be false. The basic point is that CIA theories insist that the index of evaluation is pretty much invisible to, and irrelevant for, the interpretation of epistemic modals. This is conceptually pretty awkward: the CIA requires us to jettison the nifty way of dealing with embeddings in a general way. And it is also empirically pretty embarrassing: many a might-claim outscoped by a past tense operator is predicted to be false (so long as at a the prejacent of the might is known to be false).
The other issues we want to raise are independent of issues involving the time-coordinates of indices and points of assessment, so we will generally suppress the t's from now on.
Gibbarding
The next two kinds of problems involve various asymmetries between the evidence available to the speaker and the evidence available to the assessor. We first consider cases in which the assessor knows less than the speaker.
We will assume here that the CIA-analysis 
should extend to the dual of might: must. (If might and must are duals, it is hard to see how there is any room to favor CIA theories for one and not the other.) Here as well, the true CIA agent will adopt a semantics according to which what matters is what the assessor knows at the time of assessment. By the CIA's lights, an assessor j a should reject any must-claim whose truth (with respect to a) would rule out worlds compatible with the facts at a (or whose truth would require such worlds to have already been ruled out). CIA theorists tend to spill a lot of ink over cases of modal disagreement. That is not so surprising. What is surprising is how little attention is paid to cases of "uptake"-more or less plain vanilla information exchange between speaker and hearer.
Consider an analogue of the Gibbard phenomenon (Gibbard 1981) . 10 
The Boss has two informants, Jack and Zack. There is a meeting of spies in a room, and The Boss, Jack, and Zack know that one and only one of their (conveniently named) comrades P, Q, R is a turncoat. Jack looks through his peep hole and sees clearly that it is either P or Q who is the turncoat, and Zack looks through his peep hole and sees clearly that it is either Q or R who is the turncoat. Each slips The Boss a note informing him: (22) a. [From Jack]: It must be that either P is the turncoat or Q is the turncoat. b. [From Zack]: It must be that either Q is the turncoat or R is the turncoat.
The Boss gets the messages, concluding that Q is the turncoat. Edgington (1995) . (23) 
The scenario we use here is based on one used by
But is there room for this in the CIA theory? Not as things stand. Let a be the point of assessment The Boss occupies. He has no information at a about who the turncoat is, and hence the modal base [[B]]
is either false at the point of assessment he occupies (if there aren't two reds) or his reply (24) violates the maxim of quantity (if there are). But his reply is marked in no way.
might and and/or
Sally does not know where Joe is, but she knows he is in either Boston
Why a disjunction of two existential modal claims entails each of its disjuncts is a bit of a puzzle, but that it is an entailment is clear.
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The point we want to make is that CIA theories predict Sally to be met with disagreement if she utters (25) Teller's (1972) Hawthorne (2004, 27n68 ) makes a similar observation.
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